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,t\fghanistan: Political Exiles in Search of a State 
Barnett R. Ru bin 
United States Institute of Peace 
When Afghan exiles in Pakistan convened a shura (coun-
cil) in Islamabad to choose an interim government on February 
10. 1989. they were only the most recent of exiles who have 
aspired and often managed to Mrule" Afghanistan. The seven 
parties of the Islamic Union ofM ujahidin of Afghanistan who had 
convened the shura claimed that. because of their links to the 
mujahidin fighting inside Afghanistan. the cabinet they named 
was an Minterim government" rather than a Mgovernment-in -
exile. ~ but they soon confronted the typical problems of the latter: 
how to obtain foreign recognition, how to depose the sitting 
government they did not recognize, and how to replace the 
existing opposition mechanisms inside and outside the country. 
Exiles in Afghan History 
The importance of exiles in the history of Afghanistan 
derives largely from the difficulty of state formation in its 
sparsely settled and largely barren territory. Especially after 
much of the complex irrigation networks and urban settle-
ments were destroyed by Genghis Khan in the thirteenth 
century, Afghanistan was primarily a mountainous border -
land at the intersection of the imperial territories of Iran, 
Turkic Central Asia, and India. State formation in Afghanistan 
generally required access to the resources of these richer 
areas. 
The population was largely tribal. and the divisiveness of 
tribal and clan feuds also made it difficult for a leader to emerge 
over too large a segment of the society. Aspiring leaders often 
made their careers through service to the neighboring empires. 
where their highlanders' cavalry skills were much in demand. 1 
Indeed, the founder of the Afghan monarchy in 1747, 
Ahmad Shah Durrani. started his career in the Afghan horse of 
the Persian emperor Nadir Shah. While his service outside the 
borders of present-day Afghanistan - which did not exist as a 
political unit at that time-was not exile. the use to which he put 
his access to external resources illustrates one of the factors 
accounting for the importance of exiles in Afghanistan's political 
history. Ahmad Shah's seizure of much of Nadir Shah's treasury 
after the latter's assassination did much to establish his power 
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after his election as king at a tribalJirga (council) and set him on 
his way to equipping an army. He then embarked on conquest 
and raids of the territories of the declining Mughal emp ire . He 
supported his rule mainly with resources derived from tructng the 
rich agricultural areas of Punjab and Kashmir.• 
As the Russian and British empires advanced toward 
Afghanistan in the nineteenth century, they introduce d the 
institutions of the modem state system. Both used exile and 
support for exiles as political tools. The two greatest rule rs of 
nineteenth century Afghanistan, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan 
(reigned 1826-1839, 1843-1863) and Amir Abd-ur-Ra hman 
Khan (reigned 1880-1901), ascended to the throne after peri ods 
of exile. the former in British India. the latter in Russian Cen tral 
Asia. 3 
The First Anglo-Afghan War ( 1839-1842) began when the 
British installed an Afghan exile, Shah Shuja, on the throne of 
Kabul, forcing his rival, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, into exile 
in India. After Shah Shuja was overthrown and the Bri tish 
garrison massacred by the tribes during its retreat to Jalala bad , 
the British allowed Dost Mohammad Khan to return to Kabul an d 
resume the throne.• 
TheSecondAnglo-AfghanWar(l878-1880)likewiseen ded 
with the assumption of the throne by a former exile, Amir Abd-
ur-Rahman Khan, who, despite, or perhaps because of, his 
twelve-year exile in Russian-governed Samarkand and Tashke nt, 
greatly distrusted the Russians and became a firm ally of Brit ain. 
It was during his reign (1880-1901) that Afghanistan entere d the 
modem state system as a demarcated nation-state with rec og-
nized domestic sovereignty. Amir Abd-ur-Rahman Khan , how-
ever, ceded control of his foreign relations to the British. In ret urn 
for this concession. the British gave the Amir a yearly subsi dy in 
cash and weapons which enabled him to crush the 40 revolts 
against his rule. 10 of which took on the magnitude of civil wars. 5 
The Amir continued the practice. begun by the Britis h . of 
using foreign exile as a tactic in dealing with political riva ls .• 
While lesser opponents might expect any of a variety of sad is tic 
Central Asian punishments,' prominent sardars (tribal lea ders) 
of the Moharnmadzai royal clan who had supported rival claim-
ants to the throne or otherwise opposed him were forced to live 
abroad. Among the exiled sardars, who were subseque ntly 
readmitted to Afghanistan by either Abd-ur-Rahrnan or his son 
and successor. Amir Habibullah Khan (1901-1919), were two 
families that subsequently played vital roles in Afghanist an's 
politics: the Tarzis and the Musahiban. 
The Tarzis lived in Damascus, then under Ottoman rule. 
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and the Musahiban in British India. Ghulam Mohammad Tarzi, 
a prominent poet. and his son, Mahmud Beg Tarzi, also traveled 
to France and Egypt.a The Musahiban, including Nadir Khan 
(who became king in 1929) and his four brothers, subsequently 
spent most of the 1920s in a second exile in France. These exiles 
were exposed to Western culture, politics, and technology, from 
which Afghanistan was then quite isolated. Both the Tarzis and 
the Musahiban played important roles in the introduction to 
Afghanistan of the ideology of "modernization" which they had 
imbibed during their years abroad. 
Mahmud Beg Tarzi developed Islamic modernism in 
Afghanistan and gathered around him an elite group known as 
the "Young Afghans," after the Young Turks. His most influential 
follower was his son-in-law. KingArnanullah Khan (1919-1928). 
the son of Amir Habibullah Khan. who managed to seize the 
throne when his father was assassinated in 1919. Tarzi initially 
served Arnanullah as Foreign Minister. but resigned in 1925 in 
disagreement with what he viewed as his son-in-law's overly 
hasty imposition of the modernist ideas they shared on Afghani-
stan's tribal. Islamic society. A combination of tribal and funda-
mentalist revolts drove both Amanullah and Tarzi into exile in 
1929. Tarzi died in Istanbul in 1933: Arnanullah died in Rome in 
1960 .• 
Besides his more important reforms. Arnanullah also 
introduced diplomatic exile into the repertory of Afghan political 
tactics. Arnanullah's declaration of complete independence for 
Afghanistan, formalized in a treaty with Britain after the Third 
Anglo-Afghan War (1919). enabled him to found Afghanistan's 
diplomacy . When a rift developed between him and the Musahi-
ban in 1924. he appointed Nadir Khan. who previously had 
commanded his armed forces. as ambassador to France. Nadir 
Khan soon resigned and lived on the Riviera until the overthrow 
of Amanullah provided him and his brothers with an opportunity 
to return to Afghanistan. 
In January 1929 Kabul had fallen to a Tajik guerrilla 
leader named Habibullah 10 who ruled as Amir of Afghanistan for 
nine months with the support of some fundamentalist clergy and 
ethnic minorities. Pash tun tribal forces led by Nadir Khan ousted 
him the following October. Like all exiles from landlocked Af-
ghanistan Nadir required at least the acquiescence of those who 
controlled the surrounding territories. Nadir received somewhat 
more than that from the British. They instructed their agents in 
the border areas to allow not only his passage but that of tribal 
forces from the Indian side of the frontier. who formed part of the 
army Nadir led into Kabul. As previously in Afghanistan. the 
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quasi-military social organization of the tribes obviated the 
exiles' need for any dilTerentiated political organization. Nadir 
Khan, like Abd-ur-Rahman Khan and Dost Mohammad Khan 
before him, used his political skills and tribal kinship links to 
step into the political void left at the top by the fissiparousness 
of the segmentary lineage system among the tribes. 
Upon his assassination in 1933 by a servant of the rival 
Charkhl family, Nadir Shah (as Nadir Khan was known as king) 
was succeeded by his son Mohammad Zahir Khan, who then 
became known as Mohammad Zahir Shah. The nineteen-year-
old boy was left to himself while his uncles ran the kingdom. In 
1953 his cousin Daoud, 11 the Minister of Defense and former 
military commander, took over as Prime Minister in a palace 
coup. Daoud ruled for ten years, and that decade saw accelerated 
attempts at "modernization," including the training and equip-
ping of a modern army by the Soviet Union and the expansion of 
the educational system with aid from several foreign countries, 
including the U.S., France, Egypt, West Germany, and the USSR. 
Daoud was forced to resign in 1963, and Zahir Shah inaugurated 
ten years of attempted constitutional rule. During this period 
there were two parliamentary elections, and the royal family was 
not permitted to participate in politics. 
In 1973 Daoud overthrew his cousin with the help of 
leftist army and air force officers, including members of the 
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (POPA), a pro-Soviet 
Marxist-Leninist party that had been founded in 1965. This was 
Afghanistan's first full-fledged military coup organized by profes-
sional officers. and it marked the entry onto the political stage of 
the new intelligentsia produced by the expansion of education 
and state employment since 1953. Daoud proclaimed Afghani-
stan a Republic with himself as President. 
By this time, after ten years of relative freedom and forty 
years without a serious challenge to the power of the ruling 
dynasty, virtually all Afghan political exiles had returned home. 
including the remains of King Amanullah, which had been 
entombed with honors in Jalalabad. The 1973 coup. however. 
once again created exiles whose struggles eventually came to 
dominate Afghan politics. 
Exiles from Daoud's Republic of Afghanistan 
The first exile from Daoud's Republic was Zahir Shah 
himself. Daoud staged his coup while Zahir was in Italy, and the 
latter stayed there. He has lived in a modest villa outside of Rome 
since that time. Until Daoud was overthrown and killed in 1978 
by the same officers who had helped him to power in 1973, he 
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sent a stipend to his deposed cousin. Thereafter Zahir Shah has 
reportedly been supported by the Saudi royal family. His cousin 
and son-in-law. Abdul Wall Khan, who had been commander of 
the army's Central Forces. including the Kabul garrison, at the 
tiine of the coup. was allowed by Daoud to Join him after being 
imprisoned for two years. Today Zahir Shah remains one of 
Afghanistan's most prominent political exiles. and Abdul Wali. 
who acts as his gatekeeper. is suspected of wishing to be his 
successor as well. From 1973 to 1978 a few other former ofIIcials 
and dignitaries of the royal regime, virtually all of whom had 
western educations, also emigrated to Europe and the United 
states. where they acted more as immigrants than exiles. 
From 1973 to 1983 Zahir Shah made no public state-
ments about Afghanistan and behaved more like a retired king 
than an active political exile. 11 Another group that fled Daoud, 
however, immediately began planning their struggle. These were 
the leaders of Afghanistan's nascent Islamist ("fundamentalist") 
movement. who saw Daoud's republic as infiltrated by Commu-
nists and Soviet agents. Under the name of the Muslim Youth 
(Jawanan-e Musulman). this movement had gained influence 
among students at Kabul University, especially in the theology. 
engineertng. and polytechnic faculties. Its members had demon-
strated against the royal regime. which they considered un-
Islamic and overly influenced by the Soviet Union. Together with 
their mentors from the Theology Faculty who led a more secret 
group called Jamlat-e Islami-e Afghanistan (the Islamic Society 
of Afghanistan). they fled to Pakistan in 1973 and 197 4 and took 
up residence in the city of Peshawar. Among them were Gulbud-
din Hekmatyar. Burhanuddin Rab bani. Ahmad Shah Massoud, 
and Mawlawi Yunus Khales. 13 
These exiles. who then had little support or organization 
inside Afghanistan, set about the search for foreign shelter and 
support. The Pakistani government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto agreed 
to grant them asylum and military training. This was the 
beginning of the powerful ties which continue to bind the 
Islamists (and now all of the Pakistan-based muJahidin) to the 
Pakistani directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISi). the 
agency that has dealt with them since that time. According to 
Gen. Nasrullah Babur. Bhutto's governor of the Northwest 
Frontier Province and key link man with the Afghan exiles. the 
CIA also assisted in supporting them.•• 
Bhutto, a highly secularized populist leader, did not 
support the Afghan Islamists out of ideological sympathy. Paki-
stan, however. had Just lived through the trauma of losing its 
Eastern Wing when Indian military intervention completed what 
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Bengali ethnic disaif ection and violent state repression had 
begun . The predominantly Pashtun NWFP was also a site of 
ethnic resentment against the Pakistani state. The latter had 
inherited the conflict from the British, who had formalized the 
separation of that area from Afghanistan as part of the settlement 
of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. 
The government of Afghanistan, and, with particular 
fervor, Daoud, had never recognized the Durand Line between 
the NWFP and Afghanistan as an international boundary. Af-
ghanistan claimed that the Pashtun areas of Pakistan (which the 
Afghan government called Pashtunistan) should have the option 
of independence or union with Afghanistan. When Daoud took 
power in 1973, he resumed his militancy on the Pashtunistan 
question. which Zahir Shah had muted . Bhutto and Babur saw 
in the Afghan Islamist exiles a force they could use to counter 
Daoud's pressures and bring him to negotiate an end to the 
dispute . At the same time, they foresaw that with the overthrow 
of the Afghan monarchy by Soviet-trained army officers , Afghani-
stan might be entering a period of instability and external 
intervention, and they wanted Pakistan to have some assets in 
the coming struggle . Not only did they train and arm the 
Islamists, they began a program of intensified road -building up 
to the Afghan border, which today allows Pakistani military 
trucks to supply the mujahidin . 
The Afghan Islamists also sought aid from foreign sources 
likely to be more sympathetic to them ideologically. In 1974 
Burhanuddin Rabbani , a former lecturer at Kabul University's 
Theology Faculty and the leader ("AmirM) of Jamiat-e Islami, 
traveled from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia to seek support for the 
Afghan Islamic cause. Rab bani, like many of the teachers on the 
Theology Faculty, had been educated at Cairo'sAl -Azhar Univer-
sity, where he had come into contact with the Muslim Brother-
hood, some of whose members (now political exiles from Egypt 
themselves) worked for the Saudi-sponsored World Muslim 
League (Rabitat al · 'Alam al -Islamf.._often known as Rabita)_. It is 
unclear whether Rab bani succeeded in attracting any oflkial aid 
at that time, but he may have begun the relationship which still 
continues between the Afghan Islamists and private Saudi 
religious organizations and donors . 
While Rab bani was in SaudiArabia, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 
apparently began to organize his own followers separately. 
Hekmatyar, a Pashtun, eventually led most of the Pashtun 
Islamists into a separate organization , the Hezb -e Islami (Islamic 
Party), while Rabbani, a Tajik , remained the leader of a now 
predominantlyTajik.Jamiat . Massoud , who ls now Jamiat'smost 
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famous commander, seems to have Joined Hezb initially, al-
though he is a TaJik from PanJsher. 
Besides the ethnic difference, which was never articu-
lated in public, Helonatyar and Rabban1 split over strategy. 
Hek.matyar agreed to the Pakistani proposal to set off an imme-
diate insurrection, which Bhutto hoped would bring Daoud to 
negotiate. (His goal was to exert pressure, not give the Isla.mists 
the capability of winning any significant victories.) Rabbani 
argued that such a move was premature, as more political work 
needed to be done. In July 1975, some of the Islamlsts tried to 
stage an uprising. which came to be known as the Panjsher 
Valley incident. after the only area where it had any significant 
1rnpact. Even in PanJsher, however, the insurgents were quickly 
defeated. as the population did not respond to their calls. Those 
who escaped capture (93 were arrested). including Massoud. 
returned to Pakistan. where they continued to be maintained by 
the ISi and perhaps the CIA.15 
Exiles from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan I: POPA 
Factional Exiles 
The coup of April 27. 1978 (known to its supporters as the 
"Saur Revolution." after the Persian zodiacal month of Saur. or 
Taurus. in which it occurred) led to the establishment by decree 
of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). This coup by 
leftist army officers. who quickly turned over power to the 
leadership of the PDPA. greatly enhanced the stature of the 
existing Islamist exiles and created new groups of exiles. includ-
ing less radical Sunni Islamic leaders. Shi ·a leaders who 
generally fled to Iran. traditional nationalist leaders. a broad 
spectrum of the intellectuals. and members of various defeated 
factions of the POPA In addition, it began the flow of refugees 
who today total over 5 million of Afghanistan's estimated popu-
lation of about 15.5 million. 
The PDPA was badly factionalized from its beginning; two 
years after its founding it split into the PDPA-Khalq{masses). led 
by Nur Mohammad Taraki. and the PDPA-Parcham (flag). led by 
Babrak Karmal. Khalqis were mainly first-generation educated 
tribal Pashtuns of rural origin. while Parchamls were ethnically 
mixed urbanites. generally of higher social status and educa-
tion.'" The Parchamls had supported Daoud's 1973 coup and 
initially participated in his govenrment. Daoud soon removed 
them from high positions. but they remained at lower levels, 
including in the officer corps. The two factions reunited rather 
tenuously under Soviet pressure in 1977 and carefully shared 
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positions in the government that took over after the 1978 coup. 
During the entire period of the party's existence as an 
open secret (1965-1978. when there were no laws legalizing the 
existence of political parties in Afghanistan). while some party 
members and leaders were arrested. none were forced into exile . 
Its leaders were well-known members of Kabul society, although 
the extent of its membership. especially inside the armed forces 
and the government bureaucracy, was a closely guarded secret. 
Once the factional leaders had taken power and thus had access 
to means of repression. they quickly made up for the relative 
tolerance they had previously enjoyed by vigorously attacking 
each other. 
By July the Khalqis had removed all Parchamis from the 
government and party leadership . While lesser Parchamis were 
arrested. tortured. and even killed. the leading Parchamis were 
sent into diplomatic exile, mostly to Warsaw Pact countries." 
After plans for a Parchami coup were allegedly discovered in 
August. these six were expelled from the party and ordered home, 
but instead they disappeared for some time. most of them to 
Moscow. 
Little has been revealed of the activities of the Parchami 
exiles in Moscow in 1978-1979. but it appears that they heavily 
lobbied the leadership of the CPSU. mainly through the interna-
tional department of the Central Committee. arguing that the 
Khalqis. and especially their ultra-radical organization man, 
Hafizullah Amin. were leading the Saur Revolution to disaster. 
Babrak and his followers did not constitute themselves officially 
as a government-in-exile, but they acted like one. They claimed 
to their foreign sponsor, the USSR. that they were the rightful 
leaders of Afghanistan and the POPA and urged Soviet action to 
remove the usurper Amin. They wished, however, to avoid the 
stigma of openly being installed by a foreign power. The first plan 
they and the Soviets developed involved an anti-Amin alliance 
between Babrak, still in Moscow, and Taraki. This ended with the 
arrest and secret execution of Taraki in September 1979, after 
which Amin openly assumed supreme power. 
Finally, Babrak returned to Kabul at the end ofDecember 
1979 after Soviet troops had deposed and killed Amin. While he 
claimed to have been chosen as party leader in a secret meeting 
inside Afghanistan. a meeting which supposedly also decided on 
the overthrow and execution of Amin, Babrak's behavior was in 
fact that of a classic leader of a government-in-exile. He broad-
cast an invitation to Soviet troops from Dushanbe, Soviet Tajiki-
stan, and entered Kabul with his entourage three days later. 1• He 
then established himself as General Secretary of the POPA and 
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President of the Revolutionary Council, placing his Parchaimi 
former fellow exiles in key positions. Najibullah, in particular . 
became head of the reorganized secret police, now known as 
l{hAD. the State Information Sexvices. the regime's most impor-
tant and effective agency. 
Some Khalqi leaders who were neither arrested nor killed 
were subsequently sent into diplomatic exile. 1• Khalq was now 
divided into pro-Amin and pro-Tarakl factions. however. and the 
leader of the pro-Tarakl faction. Sayyed Mohammad Gulabzoi, 
was named Minister of the Interior, in which post he commanded 
his own security force and engaged at times in nearly open war 
with Najibullah's KhAD. 
Gulabzoi himself was sent into exile as ambassador to 
Moscow in November 1988 as part of Najibullah's political 
preparations for the Soviet troop withdrawal, which was com-
pleted on February 15. 1989. The preparations for that with -
drawal had begun in March 1986, when BabrakKarmal had been 
informed in Moscow during the CPSU Congress that he would be 
replaced as PDPA General Secretary by Najibullah. In November 
he also lost his position as President of the Revolutionary 
Council. and the next month Najibullah announced the plan for 
wnaUonal reconciliation," a program for power sharing with the 
resistance which Babrak had apparently resisted . These moves 
precipitated a factional split in Parcham between pro-Babrak 
and pro-Najibullah factions, and Babrak as well as some of his 
closest collaborators were ultimately sent into exile in the USSR. 
where Soviet dissidents reported sighting him in Moscow restau -
rants. 
Other PDPA opponents of national reconciliation have 
been sent into obscure diplomatic exile, such as Ismail Danesh. 
who had to endure the insult ofbeing appointed second secretary 
of the Afghan Embassy in Libya. Gulabzoi lost his post when 
Najibullah and the Soviets had apparently agreed that. after the 
Soviet withdrawal, the PDPA could no longer afford open faction-
alism . •0 He was reportedly taken from his house at night by Soviet 
soldiers and escorted by them to the airport, where they put him 
on a plane for Moscow. Before his exile, he had traveled at least 
twice to Moscow to argue that he and the Khalqis would be better 
suited to take over the government and stand on their own 
against the mujahidin after the Soviet withdrawal. The author 
knows of no indications that he has continued this campaign 
since being appointed ambassador. 
Exiles from the ORA II: Mujahldin and their Sponsors 
Inside Afghanistan, the Khalqi policy of imposing revolu -
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tionary change by decree backed up by violent repression led to 
revolts which were often unconnected to exile politics." Nonethe-
less, the cycle of revolt and repression both changed the status 
of the existing exiles and brought many new groups of refugees, 
some of whom became politically active. The local leaders of 
relatively spontaneous army mutinies or village uprisings needed 
weapons and political representation: the hundreds of thou-
sands, then millions, of village refugees needed intermediaries 
with the authorities of the host countries. These were needs the 
exiles could meet. at the cost of striking deals with those who 
supplied them. 
The new exiles included members or sympathizers of the 
Islamist groups who had remained in Afghanistan. Many of these 
took up permanent residence in Pakistan or Iran, but others 
returned to Afghanistan with weapons to lead the fronts of Jihad. 
One small movement of this group back to Afghanistan included 
a few of the veterans of the 1975 uprising. including Massoud 
and his close associate, Mohammad Es'haq, who returned to 
Panjsher in order to apply the political and military lessons they 
had learned from their previous failures. 
The Islamists hardly represented the totality of the reli-
gious establishment in Afghanistan. but the atheistic fervor of 
the Khalqis spared no one. More traditional religious leaders who 
had not challenged the legitimacy of the royal regime or of 
President Daoud, whatever their misgivings about certain poli-
cies. soon fled for their lives and Joined their more radical 
colleagues in exile. The Sunni leaders went to Pakistan and the 
Shi 'a leaders, representing a minority sect in Afghanistan, to 
Iran, especially Qom. Among the prominent Sunni leaders were 
Sayed Ahmad Gallant, the leader of the Qadiri Sufi sect in 
Afghanistan, and Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, a prominent 
religious scholar and former parliamentary deputy from Logar 
province. They were Joined in Pakistan by a member of one of 
what was, along with the Gallants, one of the two most prominent 
religious families in Afghanistan, Hazrat Sibghatullah MoJad-
dedi. The Mojaddedis were the leaders of the main branch of the 
Naqshbandi Sufi sect in Afghanistan and had traditionally 
played important political roles; they proclaimed the Islamic le-
gitimacy of the country's rulers and acted as mediators between 
the court and the tribes in time of crisis. Most of the male 
members of the family were killed by the Khalqi government in 
February 1979, but Sibghatullah, who had remained in exile as 
head of the Saudi-funded Islamic Center in Copenhagen, sur-
vived along with those members of the family who had Joined him 
in Denmark . ., These three leaders became the heads of the three 
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parties of the Afghan resistance which variously cmne to be 
1cnown as "moderate ," "traditionalist," or "nationalist ." 
Besides these religious leaders, the waves of arrests and 
killings of members of the educated elite who were suspected of 
opposition to the PDPA drove increasing numbers of that class 
into exile . Many of these intellectuals either had .a secular 
orientation or were Islamic modernists in the tradition ofTarzi. 
In Kabul they had opposed the Islamists, who protested the 
moderate Westernizing policies of the Musahiban monarchy . 
.Among them were surviving former ministers of the constitution -
alist period (many others of these ministers disappeared in the 
Khalqi priSons). some of whom had at times tried to establish 
political parties or clubs. generally with a nationalist or moderate 
modernist complexion . They resented the prominence given by 
the Pakistanis and other donors to the religious figures, espe -
cially the Islamists, and many of them subsequently emigrated 
to Western countries . 
Most numerous. however. were the uneducated peasants 
and others who were victims of the government's (and later the 
USSR's) policies of massive reprisals against civilians . For in -
stance, many of the inhabitants of Herat fled to Iran after the 
uprising and ensuing battle in that city in February 1979 .23 Many 
tribes of Paktia fled to Pakistan after a government offensive 
there in September 1979 . Some tribes retroactively justified their 
emigration on the grounds that now that Afghanistan was ruled 
by kafers (unbelievers) it was their religious duty to undertake 
hjjra (emigration) to an Islamic territory, on the model of Moham -
mad 's emigration from pre-Islamic Mecca to Medinah . 
The Establishment of Exile Mujahldln Organizations 
As these groups struggled to organize themselves on 
foreign. mainly Pakistani, territory, to obtain the various types of 
assistance they needed, and to build or consolidate links with the 
internal resiStance. ideologies and foreign patronage interacted 
with factional. personal. and ethnic loyalties. After the direct 
Soviet military intervention of December 1979, the resistance 
and refugee organizations began to assume the forms they have 
retained to this day. The Soviet intervention both accelerated the 
flow of refugees of all types (including thousands of surviving 
prisoners who had been released in an early attempt by the 
regime to distance itself from the former government's repres-
sions) and intensified the interest of foreign powers in the 
conflict . 
Each leader (or would-be leader) tried to construct his 
own network. using his links to various groups and whatever 
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resources he could extract from various patrons. One pec uliar 
route to the formation of an organization was taken by thr ee of 
the leaders who were eventually recognized by Pakistan: they 
were chosen as compromise candidates for the leadershi p of a 
coalition. largely because they had no organization of their own 
to threaten the coalition's members, and used this positi on to 
tum the coalition into a separate organization with themse lves 
as the leader .•• 
It was ultimately the Afghan cell of the Pakistan mi litary 
government, consisting of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq (then Chief Martial 
Law Administrator) and some generals close to him as well as the 
leadership of the ISi. who decided which Afghan political forc es 
would be recognized. They decided from the beginning that 
explicitly pro-royalist or tribal forces, associated with the Pas h -
tunistan demand, would play no role. They did not want to 
channel weapons and other aid through Afghan nationalists who 
might appeal to Pakistani Pashtun dissidents. Instead th ey 
preferred parties with an explicitly religious orientation. and 
among those, the parties closest to the ISi and the Pakist ani 
Islamist organization, the Jama'at-e Islami, the only party in 
Pakistan to offer qualified support to the military regime. (In this 
respect, the choice was also dictated by the quest for domes tic 
and international legitimacy of the then isolated regime of Gen . 
Zia). 
Initially. in 1980-81. they settled on six parties. Th ree 
were derived from the old Islamist exiles. the Hezb ofGulbuddi n, 
a breakaway faction also called Hezb-e Islam! led by Mawlawi 
Yunus Khales. and Rabbani's Jamtat. Three more parties rep re-
sented more traditional forms of Islam, Mojaddedi's Natio nal 
Liberation Front. Gailani's National Islamic Front of Afgha ni -
stan. and Mohammadi's Islamic Revolutionary Movement of 
Afghanistan. 
A seventh party was subsequently recognized after the 
parties formed a brief coalition called the Islamic Union for the 
Liberation of Afghanistan. As head of this alliance. from whi ch 
the three traditionalist parties soon withdrew. the parties agree d 
upon Abd-ur-Rabb-ur-Rasul Sayyaf, a former lecturer from 
Kabul University's Theology Faculty .• , Sayyafs main qualifi ca-
tion was that he spoke excellent Arabic and sometimes (depend -
ing on his audience) professed to follow the Wahhabi sect ofis lam 
favored by the Saudi monarchy . He was therefore a formi dable 
fundraiser in the Gulf . He used his talents. however. to buil d up 
his own organization. despite the near universal hostility of 
Afghans to Wahhabism . His party, of course, is the Islamic Union 
for the Liberation of Afghanistan . 
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The ISI consistently favored the Islamists over the tradi-
uonalists and the Hezb ofHekmatyar over the other Islamists. for 
a combination of reasons: the fonner had longstanding ties to the 
!SI and were deemed to be more controllable: the Islamists and 
especially Hezb were supposedly more effective and better disci-
plined: and the Jama 'at-e Islam! politically favored those parties 
on ideological grounds, while the military felt more confident that 
they would not raise the nationalist Pashtunistan issue. Sayyaf 
has further enjoyed immense Arab financial backing, which has 
enabled him, alone of all the parties, to pay wages to his 
mujahidin. The Saudi Red Crescent also paid the entire costs of 
transporting heavy weapons into Afghanistan for the Islamist 
parties. but only a portion (given by one source as 15 percent) for 
the traditionalist parties. •a 
Until 1985 there were two alliances: one of the Islamists. 
which existed only on paper. and one of the traditionalists. which 
actually had a joint office in Peshawar and even promoted some 
joint organizations inside Afghanistan. especially in the deeply 
traditional tribal areas along the Pakistan border. By May 1985, 
however, the Pakistani and American sponsors of these organi-
zations had decided that in order to increase the diplomatic and 
political pressure on the Soviet Union it was necessary for the 
mujahidin to form a single alliance capable of representing them 
abroad. They finally succeeded in pressuring the seven groups to 
form a coalition called the Islamic Union ofMujahidin of Afghani-
stan. 07 The existing moderate alliance office was closed, and each 
of the seven parties · retained its pre-existing structure. The 
leaders of the seven parties rotated three-month terms as 
spokesman . Decisions were taken by consensus, which is to say 
they were often not taken, unless the ISi representative who 
always attended the meeting absolutely insisted. 
The ISi and CIA never tried to make this coalition take 
over the most important function - transferring weapons into 
Afghanistan - from the parties. The Slate Department and 
USAID. however, attempted to tum it into a more genuine 
organization by channelling their cross-border humanitarian 
assistance through committees of the Alliance. This met only 
limited success. 
Inside Afghanistan the alliance had little formal pres-
ence. The mujahidin were affiliated with the parties, and in some 
areas they developed means of cooperation either across broader 
regions or among the parties, but these locally based structures 
were not usually connected to the alliance of the exiled leaders. 28 
The allegiance of the commanders to the exiled leaders ranged 
from the purely opportunistic (those who Joined a party solely to 
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obtain weapons) to the committed (pre-war activists of the 
Islarnist movement who continued their organizational invo lve-
ment in a new form). Except for some in the border region who 
were in fact based in Pakistan, the mujahidin did not recei ve 
instructions from Peshawar : their relations with the party he ad -
quarters were characterized more by negotiation and expedienc y 
than hierarchical control. 
The Geneva Accords and the "Second Track" 
For most of the war. the Pakistan and the U.S. govern-
ments regarded their support for the exile- led Afghan parti es 
mainly as a way to increase the military and political costs of the 
Soviet intervention . Since they did not believe that the Soviets 
would withdraw. they were not very concerned with the capacit y 
of the resistance organizations to organize a political alternativ e 
to the Kabul government. 
This perspective changed by the end of 1987. when it wa s 
becoming clear that Gorbachev in fact intended to withdra w 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan through the U.N.-sponsor ed 
Geneva negotiations. Previously the U.S., Pakistan. and the 
parties they supported had not participated in various efforts to 
propose political changes in Kabul. The first public attempt to 
build a new legitimate government was made by Zahir Shah . In 
mid-1983, when it seemed that Soviet leader Yuri Androp ov 
might successfully negotiate a Soviet pullout. Zahir Shah issue d 
his first public declaration in ten years. At that time there was no 
functioning alliance of mujahidin, and Zahir Shah called on 
Afghans to unite to form a body that could represent them.•• He 
made it clear that. if he were asked. he would be willing to hea d 
such a body in his personal capacity. 3 0 Some of his forme r 
ministers and diplomats, tribal leaders. and some supporters of 
the moderate resistance parties developed plans to hold a Loy a 
Jirga .. the traditional tribal assembly. with the ex-king presidin g, 
and they had pressured him into finally taking a public stan d. 
The Islamists. however, denounced these efforts as an attempt to 
restore the corrupt monarchy. and Pakistan ref used to allow the 
Jirga to take place on Pakistani territory. In any case . as 
Andropov fell ill and the U.S . and Pakistan hardened the ir 
positions. the Geneva negotiations were stalemated . 
The next proposal came from Moscow after the election of 
Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU. In a maj or 
speech on Soviet Asian policy delivered on July 28. 198 6. 
Gorbachev called for the formation of an Afghan governme nt 
"with the participation in it of those political forces which foun d 
themselves outside the country" - a reference to exiled resis-
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tance leaders. refugees. and the former king. On December 30. 
l986. after returning from a trip to Moscow accompanied by the 
entire Kabul leadership. Najibullah announced details of a 
proposal for Mnational reconciliation. "31 
In theory. the national reconciliation program envisaged 
a coalition government composed of all political elements. in-
cluding the exiled resistance parties. For the first time. the 
Afghan Communists recognized the legitimacy of other organized 
political currents and offered them representation. In an attempt 
to split the internal resistance from the exiled leaders. Najibullah 
publicly appealed to major resistance commanders (some of 
whom his government had previously sentenced to death in 
absentia) to join the government. 
There was little movement toward a new government 
until Gorbachev's speech February 8. 1988. which met 
Washington's demand for a short timetable and a Mdate certain" 
for withdrawal. and also countered a new position taken by 
Pakistan. or at least by President Zia. When he realized that the 
Soviets were about to meet the Americans· demands for a 
umetable, Zia seemingly reversed his position and stated that he 
did not want Pakistan to sign the agreement without the forma-
tion of an interim government.3 2 Under strong Pakistani pressure 
and despite continuing sharp differences over the form of a 
future government of Afghanistan. the alliance announced on 
February 25 that it had agreed on a formula for an interim 
government, but it could not agree on even a partial cabinet until 
June 19. Indeed. according to diplomatic sources. the members 
of the alliance were utterly unable to reach agreement. and the 
final list of cabinet members was drawn up by an extremely 
frustrated Gen. Hamid Gul. director of the ISi. after he ref used 
to let the seven leaders finish another meeting without reaching 
agreement. 
The proposed government disappointed those who had 
hoped it would serve as a starting point for serious negotiations. 
It consisted almost solely of officials of the Peshawar parties and 
was dominated by radical Islamists. The head of the government. 
once again in deference to Saudi financial power. was Eng. 
Ahmad Shah. a member of Sayyafs Wahhabi party. The Mgovem-
ment" contained no resistance commanders from inside Af-
ghanistan. no representative of the Shi 'a resistance parlieS, 33 
and no important independent intellectuals or technocrats. 
Predictably. the proposal met with a cold reception from the 
Afghan refugees and resistance commanders. 3 • Furthermore. 
none of the resistance's sponsors extended recognition to the 
proposed Mgovemment." 
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rnent in Kabul as well as the USSR, but in fact he met the demand 
of the mujahidin by not including any Afghan government 
representative in his delegation. This permitted them to sustain 
the belief in the illegitimacy of the Soviet-sponsored Afghan 
regime. 
Vorontsov, however, did not agree to recognize the Pesha-
war alliance as the sole representative of exiled Afghan political 
forces . He also traveled to Teheran, where he met with the eight 
Shi'a parties recognized by Iran. and to Rome, where he met 
Zahir Shah. The Peshawar alliance denounced these meetings as 
an attempt to create division. 
According to Vorontsov. out of these discussions a rough 
consensus emerged on a method for forming an interim govem-
rnent for Afghanistan . Instead of the Loya Jirga, a tribal -based 
national tradition which the Islamists rejected, the discussions 
centered on the Islamic concept of a shura. which had originally 
been proposed by Pakistan . This shura, of several hundred 
persons. would include representatives of the Peshawar and 
Iranian exiles. the ex-king, and delegates from Kabul. The main 
sticking point in the negotiations with the Soviets was over the 
nature of representation from Kabul. Vorontsov (and later, 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze himself) insisted that these 
delegates would represent the POPA, which the mujahidin 
rejected . The mujahidin broke off the talks over this issue in 
January. 
The Afghan Shura of February 1989: An Interim Government 
of Exiles 
Despite the breakdown of negotiations with the Soviets, 
the Alliance proceeded to constitute its own shura. The seven 
parties proposed that each of the leaders would nominate 60 rep-
resentatives to the shura, supposedly to be distributed among 
party workers, resistance commanders, refugees, and promi-
nent exiles . This formula guaranteed that the Islamists would 
outnumber the traditionalists. The parties also agreed that 19 
"good Muslims" from Kabul could attend, but these delegates 
were never named, and their seats remained empty. Participa-
tion by the ex-king having been rejected, the main remaining 
issue regarding the composition of the shura was the number of 
seats to be allotted to the Shi'a parties based in Iran. 
This conflict was connected to the principal issue that 
initially faced the shura : what exactly it was supposed to do. The 
shura was convened without either an agenda or rules of 
procedure. ISi officers attended all meetings and gave many 
delegates the impression of being in control. The ISi, the Saudis, 
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After the signing of the agreement, on April 14, 1988, all 
the four state parties to the accords granted the U. N. ·s negotiator 
Diego Cordovez, a mandate to assist Afghans in the formation of 
a broad-based government. He eventually developed a proposal 
for the formation of a "National Government of Peace and 
Reconstruction." He suggested two stages: a "cooling off' period 
and a Loya Jirga. In the first. "leaders of all existing political 
parties would agree to postpone their active strugg le as a 
patriotic sacrifice." During that period "A National Government 
for Peace and Reconstruction, consisting of Afghans of recog-
nized independence and impartiality. (would) take office in 
Kabul. ... "35 The new Government would then prepare for the 
convening of a Loya Jirga under rules acceptable to all parties. 
The Soviets and the POPA never formally reject ed the 
proposal. Mojaddedi and Gailani made supportive state ments. 
as did a number of prominent Pash tun resistance comma nders. 
The Islamist resistance leaders. however, rejected it, as did 
President Zia. American diplomats also disparaged it in press 
leaks. Mujahidin leaders sent several letters to U.N. Secretary 
General (S.G.) Perez de Cuellar complaining about Cord ovez. In 
November, the S.G. concluded that Cordovez, who had become 
Foreign Minister of Ecuador in August. while retaining his role as 
the S.G.'s representative on Afghanistan. could no longer serve 
as an intermediary, and he removed the broad-based govern-
ment from his brief. Although Perez de Cuellar had stated th at he 
would take personal charge of the effort. in fact he left it to a 
middle-level U.N. official based in Pakistan. 3 • 
Into this breach stepped Yuli Vorontsov, who, be sides 
being the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, had just been ap-
pointed ambassador to Kabul. His main task, apparently, was to 
oversee the final ex.it of Soviet troops and, if possible, the 
construction of a broad-based government acceptable to Moscow. 
After the announcement of the "suspension" of the Soviet troop 
withdrawal on November 15, Vorontsov proposed direct talks 
with exiled Afghan leaders. Such direct talks had been the main 
political demand the resistance leaders had made all along, and 
their absence had been their main objection to the diplom atic 
process thus far. 
Such talks had first been proposed by the Soviets in J uly, 
ostensibly to discuss Soviet prisoners of war held by the muj ahidin. 
After a first round of low-level talks in Islamabad. Moscow 
proposed discussions between Vorontsov and the leaders of the 
alliance in Saudi Arabia . The first such talks were held in Taif on 
December 3-4, 1988. and later continued in Islamabad. Vo-
rontsov claimed that he was negotiating on behalf of the govem-
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and the Islamist leaders wanted the function of the shura_to be 
limited to approving the "interim government" chosen the 
previous year. Hence they wanted to be sure of a majority in favor, 
which they would have without the Shi'a, given the four to three 
distribution derived from the structure of the alliance. However 
even though the Shi'a parties recognized by Iran were als~ 
Islamist, they would be sure to oppose any government headed 
by a Wahhabi such as Ahmad Shah (the Wahhabis are among the 
most anti-Shi 'a of all Sunni Muslims, and Saudi Arabia, the 
main patron of the Wahhabis, is the major opponent of Khomeini's 
Iran within the Islamic world.) Hence the moderates had at least 
a short-term common interest with the Shi 'a in allotting the 
latter enough seats to def eat the government of Eng. Ahmad 
Shah. The Sunni Islamists, on the other hand, wished to keep the 
number of Shi 'a delegates small. 37 
Furthermore. one of Saudi Arabia's main foreign policy 
goals ls to contain the influence of the Iranian revolution within 
the Islamic world, and Saudi representatives ultimately weighed 
in heavily against strong representation for the Shi 'a. Iran, on 
the other hand, saw in the shura a way to assert its influence in 
Afghanistan, a task which for ten years had been eclipsed by the 
recently concluded war with Iraq. 
The Sunni and Shi 'a alliances had had virtually no 
contact throughout the war, but Vorontsov's meeting with both 
had forced them to consult with each other. The negotiation 
process was complex and drawn out, including trips to Pakistan 
by the Shi 'a leaders as well as Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar 
Velayati and trips to Iran first by Rabbani and Mojaddedi in 
January and then by Mojaddedi (who was then alliance spokes-
man) in February. During this visit Mojaddedi and the Qom 
alliance reached agreement on representation of 120 delegates 
(the equivalent of two parties). which would have given the anti-
Wahhabi forces a 5 to 4 advantage. 
On his return to Pakistan, the Islamist leaders charged 
Mojaddedi with acting without authorization and refused to 
accept the agreement. The Saudis also weighed in with their 
influence and money. According to U.S. diplomats in Riyadh, the 
Saudi intelligence service spent $26 million per week during the 
shura. Other sources mention that each delegate received at least 
$25,000.3 8 One of the results of these expenditures was that, 
finally, none of the Shi'a parties supported by Iran participated 
in the shura. a result which seemed to satisfy the Saudis. The 
U.S. might not have been displeased with this outcome either. 
but it maintained a low public profile. 
Hence, when the shurafinally convened in Rawalpindi on 
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February 10, 1989, it was clearly not a broad-based body but one 
chosen by the leaders of the seven Sunni parties, who acted as 
a collective presidium. Mohammad! chaired the meeting, and 
sayyaf acted as spokesman. 3•The ISI and the Pakistani Foreign 
Ministry had prevailed on the parties to each nominate five 
members from Afghan exiles outside of Pakistan (from Europe. 
,America. or the Middle East). but most of those so named were 
merely foreign representatives of the parties. There were eight or 
nme such delegates who considered themselves genuinely inde-
pendent and met as a caucus. 
The Pakistanis and Saudis exercised their influence and 
control in different ways, but obviously enough that many 
Afghans ultimately rejected the outcome. First. even the process 
of nomination of delegates by the party leaders was not consid-
ered adequate to ensure control; there was also a screening 
committee. the origin of which remains obscure. which had to 
approve each delegate as a "good Muslim ." According to members 
of moderate-traditionalist parties. this committee met in a Paki-
stani army barracks, and ISI officers participated in its delibera-
tions. It rejected the credentials of Humayun Assefy, a former 
diplomat and a relative of Zahir Shah. •0 Events surrounding the 
shura_also made it clear that pro-Zahir Shah forces would not be 
permitted to participate. Two days before the opening of the 
shura about fifty men shouting slogans in favor of Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar violently broke up a Peshawar rally of several thou-
sand people in favor of Zahir Shah as Pakistani police looked on. 
Second. the ISI was in charge of all the security arrange-
ments. and its officers openly attended all meetings. giving 
several delegates the impression that they were in charge. They 
also summoned various delegates for consultations from time to 
time. Furthermore. most of the delegates stayed in the Ha.1J camp 
in Rawalpindi. a large complex which was closed to journalists 
and other outsiders. The only foreigners permitted to enter 
during the entire period were ISi officers and a certain number 
of Arabs, presumably Saudis. 
As noted above, the Islamists intended that the only 
function of the shura would be to approve the government of Eng . 
Ahmad Shah . Some delegates objected that the shura was only 
consultative - it had been appointed by seven persons. not 
elected by the nation - and hence did not have the authority to 
choose a government. On the third day of sessions, when Sayyaf 
announced that the meeting would now approve that govern-
ment, as one delegate described it, "a storm broke out among the 
participants." While many people were shouting various things. 
one of the most common themes was that there should not be any 
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Wahhabis in the government. The chair lost control. and the 
meeting was suspended . 
The Pakistanis and Saudis reasserted control by the end 
two weeks later, but at the cost of making their influence much 
more obvious. First the ISi convened a meeting of the seven 
leaders. The leaders then agreed to appoint a committee of 70 to 
make a proposal to the shura; this committee was then reduced 
to a group of 14. two from each party . The group of 14 was spirited 
away in the custody of the ISi and met in secret. 
It returned with a proposal for sharing cabinet positions 
among the seven leaders and their parties according to the 
results of an election. Each member of the shura was to vote for 
two of the seven party leaders. The leader with the highest 
number of votes would be president, who would act as spokes-
man and represent the government abroad. The second highest 
votegetter would be prime minister. who would actually be in 
charge of running the government. Other major ministries were 
to be apportioned among the remaining five leaders.• 1 
According to delegates to the shura , rather than leave this 
process to the Afghans. the ISi and the Saudis tried to manipu-
late the vote through various forms of pressure, including bribes. 
to assure that the outcome would be to their liking . It is not clear 
whether the election of Mojaddedi as the president coincided 
with their wishes. but at least the Pakistani Foreign Ministry was 
not displeased . Mojaddedi projected a moderate image which 
might appeal to both the West and Afghans in Kabul; he spoke 
good French. English. and Arabic, and also had a relatively good 
relationship with the Shi 'a groups. who would eventually have 
lo be brought in . He received 174 votes. the highest number. 
Mohammad! had apparently been led to believe that his being 
chosen as chair of the shura_would presage his being selected for 
head of state. and he was somewhat frustrated at this outcome. 
which led to some further disruption (see below). 
The Saudis may have wanted their candidate, Sayyaf, to 
be the president , but they were satisfied with his election as 
prime minister with 173 votes . This outcome contrasted strongly 
with the violent anti -Wahhabi reaction earlier , and at least some 
participants attribute the difference to Saudi money. Moham-
mad!, a well -known Jurist, came in third as head of the supreme 
court. The ISi may have wanted Gulbuddin Helanalyar to finish 
higher than he did , but he came in fourth and was named defense 
minister. Khales received the positions of state security and 
internal affairs,•• Rabbani the foreign ministry. and Gailani, the 
moderate considered closest to Zahir Shah. the ministries of 
reconstruction and education. •3 
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Mohammad!, however, disrupted the outcome by using a 
procedural rule that the committee of 14 had proposed. Accord-
ing to this rule, any leader could take any post lower on the list 
than the one he had won. and Mohammad! asked for the Defense 
Ministry. This infuriated Gulbuddin. There were two days of 
negotiations, and the dispute was finally settled in the office of 
Gen. Hamid Gul. Gulbuddin got Rabbani's place as foreign 
minister, Gailani became head of the supreme court, and Rab-
bani received the ministries of reconstruction and education. 
Rab bani reportedly felt that he and his Tajik constituency had 
been squeezed out of power by the Pash tuns, with the support of 
Pakistan. 
In guest of Recognition 
The proposed "government" did not directly control any 
personnel, population, or territory. The war was still being waged 
by mujahidin more or less affiliated to the seven parties and who 
had no links to the interim government except through those 
parties. While some in Washington advocated distributing weap-
ons through the new "Minister of Defense," the "ministry" in fact 
had no such capability, and the seven parties alone continued to 
transfer and distribute external aid. 
The credibility of the interim government depended on its 
ability to demonstrate control of territory and population inside 
Afghanistan and to obtain international recognition. On both 
scores, its performance in the first months of its existence fell far 
short of its sponsors' expectations or at least hopes. 
Since the mujahidin claimed to control the vast majority 
of territory of Afghanistan, the interim government claimed not 
to be a government-in-exile. It proclaimed its intention to move 
inside Afghanistan and hold elections within six months. It 
sought to hold its first meeting on Afghan territory ... The meet-
ing, however, was more a media event than an actual cabinet 
meeting . Rabbani and Gailani did not attend, and little if any 
business was conducted. 
The interim government and its supporters, especially 
the ISI, hoped that, soon after the completion of the Soviet 
withdrawal, it would be able to move inside Afghanistan more 
permanently in the wake of major military victories. In particu-
lar. the alliance seemed to hope that it would be able to move to 
Jalalabad . The alliance, however, has no joint military staff 
capable of strategic planning on a nation-wide basis, nor does it 
have the command and control capabilities necessary to coordi-
nate a national offensive to seize the government's strategic 
points. Such shortcomings had not been serious obstacles to 
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fighting a guerrilla resistance. but they had to be overcome in 
order to win a conventional battle for cities and garrisons. Rather 
than wait for the resistance to develop such capabilities - a 
somewhat dubious prospect in any event. at least among the 
feuding commanders of the border tribal zones - the ISi stepped 
in and made plans for an offensive. 
In early February. the author was told by commanders in 
the Jalalabad area that the ISi was already establishing a plan 
for an assault. despite the misgivings of many of the command-
ers in the area. The ISi similarly summoned commanders in the 
Qandahar area to a meeting and offered them money and 
weapons if they would agree to attack the garrison and the 
government-held parts of the city. In Qandahar, where the 
traditional tribal forces are still strong and are in communication 
with the government garrison. the mujahidin refused. Around 
Jalalabad. however. where the Islamists are stronger. the tribal 
organization is weaker, and Peshawar is much closer, the 
commanders eventually agreed. It appears that the timing of the 
assault was meant to coincide with the mid-March meeting of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference in Riyardh. Saudi Arabia . 
The plan apparently was to move the interim government into 
Jalalabad and request recognition from the OIC. 
In the event. while the offensive did capture some fortified 
targets and disabled part of the airport, it failed to take J alalabad 
city. The interim government nonetheless won recognition from 
Saudi Arabia (and hence Bahrain). Furthermore. the interim 
government's foreign minister. Gulbuddin Hedmatyar. attended 
the OIC meeting and was granted Afghanistan's seat. which had 
been left empty since the Soviet intervention. The OIC. of course, 
was largely influenced by the Saudi decision. which reflected the 
Saudi approval of the composition of the interim government, 
and especially its exclusion of the Iranian-sponsored groups. 
Soon after the OIC meeting the interim government was also 
recognized by Sudan and Malaysia. 0 
Neither Pakistan nor the United States. interestingly 
enough, recognized the interim government. although there were 
internal debates in both countries on what approach to take. 
Despite their active role in supporting the mujahidin and their 
denunciation of the government in Kabul as illegitimate, neither 
country had broken diplomatic relations with the latter. Al-
though neither country had sent an ambassador to Kabul since 
1979, both retained a diplomatic mission there until 1989. and 
neither has closed the Afghan government's missions in their 
own country. There is even an Afghan consulate in the University 
Town area of Peshawar. just around the comer from the head-
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quarters of the alliance. 
In the U.S .. Congressional forces led by Sen. Gordon 
Humphrey (Republican - New Hampshire) have long advocated 
that Washington break relations with Kabul and recognize the 
mujahidin. The State Department has countered that it did not 
conduct political business with Kabul. but that it was in the 
interest of the United States to keep a mission there to collect 
intelligence. Furthermore. the State Department argued. the 
alliance. and now the interim government. does not have the 
minJIDal criteria required by U.S. policy for recognition. namely 
effective administrative control of territory and population and 
the ability to carry out the international obligations of Afghani-
stan. 
Since the establishment of the interim government. 
Humphrey and others have argued that. even if the U.S . does not 
(yet) recognize it as a government, it should at least send an 
ambassadoJial level appointee to conduct relations with it. The 
U.S. embassy in Islamabad had for several years included a 
"special envoy" responsible for relations with the resistance, but 
this official reported through the Ambassador to Pakistan. Sup-
porters of direct dealings with the interim government hope that 
such a relationship will enable the U.S . to pursue a more 
independent policy, rather than simply support Pakistan's.•• 
In Pakistan the debate over recognition of the interim 
government coincides to some extent with the major political 
cleavage. that between the Bhutto government and the support -
ers of the late President Zia and his "Islamization" policies. 
Several of the Islamic parties in Pakistan have called for recog-
nition of the mujahidin government. The Pakistani government 
has argued that it cannot recognize the interim government 
because of its obligation under the Geneva accords not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, but this does not 
seem very convincing in view of the government's flouting of other 
provisions of the same accords, notably by assisting and influ-
encing the organization of the shura as well as by continuing to 
supply the mujahidin. The government's position may reflect a 
split between the Bhutto government and its foreign ministry on 
the one hand and. on the other, the military and intelligence 
agencies that have mainly controlled Afghan policy. Following 
the removal of Gen. Gul as ISI director in June 1989 (which was 
mainly dictated by domestic Pakistani politics) the foreign min-
istry and prime minister's ofTice may play a larger role. 
These disputes might have become moot had Jalalabad 
and other cities fallen . but no major centers have been taken over 
by mujahidin since the final withdrawal of Soviet troops. (Several 
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provincial capitals had fallen to them at the beginning of the 
withdrawal. including those of Bamlyan. Takhar, and Kunar .) 
There are several reasons for this. Militarily, the mujahidi n . as 
noted, do not have the command and control needed to mount 
major conventional attacks. nor do they have the heavy wea pons 
needed to attack fortified concrete bunkers, although their 
rockets can destroy (and have destroyed) civilian homes and 
civilian government buildings. 
Many analysts. however. including this one, thoug h t that 
such military capabilities would not be necessary. because of the 
political weakness of the Kabul government. which had func -
tioned for years as the umbrella for the Soviet forces. The 
mujahidin and their supporters anticipated mass defectio ns 
leading to a crumbling of the regime from within. Instea d . the 
regime's soldiers and militia have generally fought with cons id-
erable determination , more, in fact than they seem to have sho wn 
while Soviet troops were fighting alongside them . 
The main reason seems to lie in the political weakness of 
the mujahidin themselves. Their lack of unity and the lack of 
credibility of the interim government they have proposed hav e 
prevented the latter from posing a serious alternative to the 
Kabul regime as a defender of Afghanistan's national interes ts . 
The government has publicized the involvement of Pakistani and 
Arab forces with the mujahidin and has sought to portray the m 
as foreign agents. While some specific charges are exaggera ted 
(such as the charge that Pakistani soldiers are actually fighting 
inside Afghanistan, although intelligence agents are doubtle ss 
present). the overall picture of the exiled leaders' dependence on 
_foreign support is not inaccurate. At the same time Najibulla h 
has intensified initiatives aimed at attracting support of or at 
least neutralizing the internal commanders . He evinces sympa -
thy for the sufferings they have undergone, compared with the 
comforts of foreign supported exile. and has offered to supp ly 
them with all the resources they need for their areas . 
The behavior of the mujahidin and of some of the Arab 
(mainly Wahhabi) volunteers who accompany them has als o 
helped convince many of those on the government side to fight 
on . In one well-publicized case in November 1988, mujahidin 
from Hezb -e Islaml (Khales) massacred over 70 members of a 
government garrison which had defectecL Despite condemnatio n 
of this action by the resistance leaders, such actions have been 
repeated, including during the course of the battle for J alalaba d . 
Furthermore. in many areas taken over by mujahidin 
after the withdrawal of Soviet troops there was, at least initially, 
a breakdown of civil order, followed by looting. arbitrary killings 
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of people associated with the government, and rapes and killings 
of unveiled women or women who were members of the family of 
real or supposed government supporters. Such incidents oc-
curred in Kunduz (which was subsequently recaptured by the 
government), Asadabad (capital ofKunar). Taleghan (capital of 
Takhar). and elsewhere. 
In some cases these abuses resulted from indiscipline. 
but in others they were Justified on principle. The Wahhabis, and 
particularly the Arab volunteers who increasingly accompany 
them . argue that areas of Afghanistan controlled by the Commu -
rust government constitute non-Muslim territory. and that their 
inhabitants. who have refused the call oflslam , may be subjected 
to the laws of futuhat, or conquest. According to these laws. 
which originated in Arab tribal customs of the time of Moham -
mad . the men of such a territory may be executed, their women 
and children enslaved. and their property confiscated as booty. 47 
News of these atrocities has spread. and the government 
has naturally helped to dilluse them. The inhabitants of the 
government -controlled areas, whatever their political or reli -
gious views, fear that a victory of the mujahidin could mean 
death or dishonor for them. Hence there are reports that many 
1n Kabul feel trapped or that the current government, even if they 
hate it. may be better than the currently available alternative. 
This is especially true of women. but it applies to some extent to 
the entire educated middle class. The PDPA is thus increasingly 
able to cast itself as the only capable defender of the Afghan 
nationalist and modernist tradition stretching back to Tarzi. 
Many Afghans and others argue that ultimately the fate 
of the country will be determined by the commanders. such as 
Massoud , who have actual power bases inside the country, 
rather than by either the exiled leaders or the PDPA. The com -
manders. however. still face the problem which leaders of 
indigenous revolts faced in Afghanistan's past: all of them lead 
a more or less narrow segment of the society, and none of them 
can bring the others together. Nor can any of them mobilize the 
resources on his own to form a dominant army. This is why exiles 
with foreign assistance have so often been able to step in and 
rule, from Dost Mohammad to Nadir Shah . The rulers who took 
power after the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars were not 
themselves the leaders of the anti-British struggles, but exiles 
who managed to form alliances with feuding tribal military 
forces . 
At that time, however. the tribal system was the basis of 
military and political power in the region. Today the tribal system 
has decayed (unevenly, and to different extents in different 
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regions), and the technology of modem warfare has both accel-
erated the decline of the traditional society and replaced it with 
a different form of organization of armed men: guerrillas fun ded 
by ideologically motivated political organizations. To unite these 
groupings and manage the military activity of contem porary 
warfare requires more elaborate forms ofleadership and organi-
zation. Th us far neither the exile leaders of the Afghan muj ahi din 
nor the former king have shown their capabilities in these areas 
to be the equal to the devotion and bravery of the fighters at the 
front. Whether any of these exiles will be able to master these 
skills as e1Iectively as the mujahidin learned to use Stin ger 
missiles remains to be seen. 
•r would like to thank Zaid Siddig and Ghulam Ali (Mars hall) 
Ayeen for their painstaking and time consuming assistance. I 
remain responsible for all errors. All views expressed are tho se of 
the author alone, and do not represent those of the United Stat es 
Institute of Peace. 
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